Abstract
Murder of the population by the state has been common historically and in modern times. I estimate a demand function for state-sponsored murder and find that it obeys the law of demand. The main focus of the paper is estimation of the change in the growth path of economies that practice democide relative to those that do not. On average, the rent-seeking loss associated with democide is about a 20 percent loss of wealth.
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Scully, G.W. Democide and genocide as rent-seeking activities. Public Choice 93, 77–97 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017925226569
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017925226569