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Tax Level and Tax Internalization Effects on Union Wage Bargaining

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Abstract

High taxes and generous social benefits are often blamed for causing unemployment. The conventional view is that if taxes on labour are (too) high, jobs will be lost and that generous social benefits will exert an upward pressure on unions' wage claims. In the case where unions co-ordinate their wage bargaining strategy, this need not be the case. A simple model is used to illustrate the effects of the tax rate level and tax internalization on unions' wage bargaining strategy. A high marginal tax rate along with endogeneity of the average tax rate shifts the union's trade-off between wages and employment in favour of the latter. These shifts may have contributed to the success of the so-called ‘polder model’ or ‘tulip model’ of the Netherlands.

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Groot, L. Tax Level and Tax Internalization Effects on Union Wage Bargaining. De Economist 149, 219–232 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017591606418

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