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Inter-Party Competition, Intra-Party Competition, and Distributive Policy: A Model and Test Using New Deal Data

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Abstract

This paper presents a theoreticalmodel examining the influence of two stylized types ofvoters: ``loyal voters'' and ``swing voters''. The model showswhy both types of voters will influence thedistribution of benefits by a reelection-seekingincumbent, and it predicts how their influence willvary with the importance of the general electionrelative to that of the primary: closer competitionbetween parties in the general election, ceterisparibus, increases the influence of swing votersrelative to that of loyal voters. County-level dataon the allocation of money and jobs by New Deal reliefprograms confirm the model's predictions.

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Fleck, R.K. Inter-Party Competition, Intra-Party Competition, and Distributive Policy: A Model and Test Using New Deal Data. Public Choice 108, 77–100 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017572515367

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