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Public Choice

, Volume 108, Issue 3–4, pp 369–386 | Cite as

Formal human capital attainment of career legislators in the U.S. Congress: Modeling legislatures as unions

  • Franklin G. MixonJr.
Article

Abstract

The present paper employs a human capital modelthat examines, among other things, the educationalattainment of career politicians/legislators. Statistical evidence is presented which suggests thatthe formal educational levels differ systematicallybetween career and non-career politicians/legislatorsat the federal level (i.e., in the U.S. Congress) –a result consistent with the implications of thelegislative pay union model developed by McCormick andTollison (1978). Any adverse selection consequencesare potentially significant regarding the quality offederal legislation and the social cost of governmentactivities.

Keywords

Human Capital Educational Level Public Finance Social Cost Union Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Franklin G. MixonJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and International BusinessThe University of Southern MississippiHattiesburgU.S.A.

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