Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Epistemological Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Field, H. (1994): ‘Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse’, Philosophical Review 103, 405–452.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I. (1967): ‘Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability’, Philosophy of Science 34, 311–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P. (1984): The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. (1986): Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H. (1968): ‘Is Logic Empirical?’, in R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 5, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Epistemological Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic. Philosophical Studies 92, 1–24 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017147216094

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017147216094

Search

Navigation