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When Can One Requirement Override Another?

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Abstract

I argue that any theory of moral obligation must be able toexplain two things: why we cannot be thrust into a moraldilemma through no fault of our own, and why we can get intoa moral dilemma through our own negligence. The most intuitivetheory of moral obligation cannot do so. However, I offer atheory of moral obligation that satisfies both of these criteria,one that is founded on the principle that if you are required todo something, then you would be blameworthy for failing to do it.I conclude by relating these results to the current literatureon moral dilemmas.

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Rajczi, A. When Can One Requirement Override Another?. Philosophical Studies 108, 309–326 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015793012351

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015793012351

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