Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions
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Naive Russellianism entails that substitution of co-referring names in a sentence preserves the proposition expressed. Many philosophers have objected to Naive Russellianism for reasons having to do with cognitive significance and attitude ascriptions. This paper presents Naive Russellian replies to these objections; the replies appeal to different ways of believing a single proposition. This paper also criticizes Naive Russellian replies that either appeal to pragmatics or deny the existence of ways of believing.
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