Abstract
The paper examines representative cases of ``dishonest'' voting. In all but one case the claim that ``strategic voting'' is ``dishonest'' is refuted. In all cases the effects of ``misrepresentation'' need never harm any majority. Indeed majorities may benefit from ``strategy'' (in non-cycle cases too). In fact democracy demands ``strategy''. Although the universal value of the choice set is disputed even in the one recalcitrant case, the result is, after all, an element in the ``honest'' choice set.
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MacIntyre, I. |N| Cheers For Democracy. Synthese 131, 259–274 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015749211633
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015749211633