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Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow

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Abstract

This paper discusses a number of themes and arguments in The Quest for Reality: Stroud's distinction between “philosophical” and “ordinary” questions about reality; the similarity he finds between the view that coloris “unreal” and the view that it is “subjective”; his argument against thesecondary quality theory; his argument against the error theory; and the “disappointing” conclusion of the book.

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Byrne, A. Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow. Philosophical Studies 108, 213–222 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015736803819

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015736803819

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