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Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking

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Abstract

Economic regulation is characterized as (1) an effort by special interests to influence the allocation of property rights, in (2) a continuous path-dependent spontaneous evolution (as apposed to a static equilibrium), driven by (3) market, political, and bureaucratic entrepreneurship in an ongoing discovery process. The implications of the model are illustrated by an examination of the evolution of regulation in interstate trucking. The model is also used to explain that the Chicago School's political-regulatory efficiency conclusions are incorrect, and that the inefficiencies arising from rent seeking are even greater than the Public Choice approach implies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306, USA

    Bruce L. Benson

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  1. Bruce L. Benson
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Benson, B.L. Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking. The Review of Austrian Economics 15, 229–255 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015722906781

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