Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of the sources ofcandidates' campaign funding on their electoral outcomes, withparticular emphasis on whether candidates who rely on a narrowbase of funding suffer adverse electoral consequences. Anextensive dataset consisting of over 650,000 contributions toHouse candidates in elections from 1980 to 1992 is used. Theresults reveal a negative relationship between theconcentration of contributions and voteshare for open seatcandidates and challengers. This finding appears to havesignificant implications for some of the empirical premisesunderlying the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Buckley v.Valeo decision. At the very least, it represents an importantstylized fact about US elections that is robust over 1980–1992 period.
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Dharmapala, D., Palda, F. Are Campaign Contributions a Form of Speech? Evidence from Recent US House Elections. Public Choice 112, 81–114 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015671608957
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015671608957