It is shown that the axioms Cubitt and Sugden (1994; Economic J. 104: 798) impose on a theory of rationally justifiable play (TRJP) do not prevent the possibility that two players necessarily disagree concerning the probability they ascribe to the choice of a third player. This appears to indicate that those axioms are not sufficient for defining a `reasonable' TRJP. In addition, for the case in which a player's beliefs are statistically independent, conditions for a TRJP are suggested under which the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient, but the existence of a consistent n-pair is not, for defining a TRJP meeting those requirements.
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Quesada, A. Another impossibility result for normal form games. Theory and Decision 52, 73–80 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015538123387
- Normal form game
- rationally justifiable play
- quasi-strict equilibrium
- consistent n-tuple