Abstract
Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that naturalism is self-defeating. Plantinga's argument is, at its heart, an argument from analogy. Plantinga presents various epistemic situations and claims of each that (i) a person in such a situation has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs, and (ii) a reflective naturalist is in a relevantly similar situation. I present various epistemic situations and claim of each that a person in such a situation does not have an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs. I further claim that at least some of these situations are more relevantly like the situation faced by the reflective naturalist than any of the situations Plantinga describes. Therefore, Plantinga's argument fails to establish that the reflective naturalist has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs and hence fails to establish that naturalism is self-defeating.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Alston, William: forthcoming, ‘Plantinga, Naturalism, and Defeat', in James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
Beilby, James (ed.).: forthcoming, Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
Bergmann, Michael: ‘Commonsense Naturalism', in Beilby, op. cit.
Plantinga, Alvin: 1993, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Plantinga, Alvin: 2000, Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Talbott, W. J.: ‘The Illusion of Defeat', in Beilby, op. cit.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wielenberg, E.J. How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist. Synthese 131, 81–98 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015069614963
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015069614963