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Testing Inference To The Best Explanation

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Abstract

Inference to the Best Explanation has become the subject of a livelydebate in the philosophy of science. Scientific realists maintain, while scientificantirealists deny, that it is a compelling rule of inference. It seems that anyattempt to settle this debate empirically must beg the question against theantirealist. The present paper argues that this impression is misleading. A methodis described that, by combining Glymour's theory of bootstrapping and Hacking'sarguments from microscopy, allows us to test IBE without begging any antirealistissues.

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Douven, I. Testing Inference To The Best Explanation. Synthese 130, 355–377 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014859910339

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