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Synthese

, Volume 130, Issue 3, pp 317–354 | Cite as

Explanation is a Genus: An Essay on the Varieties of Scientific Explanation

  • Mariam Thalos
Article

Abstract

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explainswithout drawing attention to causes–that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinctfrom that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes theexplanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation ofthe standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physicaltheories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals oraspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insightfor a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstoneof a new theory of scientific method.

Keywords

Scientific Method Physical Theory Causal Explanation Scientific Explanation Ofthe Standard 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mariam Thalos
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of UtahSalt Lake CityU.S.A

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