Abstract
In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.
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Ehring, D. The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 107, 179–190 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014709114344
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014709114344