Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Regulating an Externality-Generating Utility Environmental Taxes Under Limited Information

  • Published:
Environmental and Resource Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Global warming is currently an important item on most nationalenvironmental agendas. In many countries, coal-fired electricity generatingstations represent an important source of greenhouse gases. We examinehow regulations to curb emissions affect public utility pricing regulationwhen regulators act non-cooperatively. We show that, when there is limitedinformation on fixed abatement costs, an environmental regulator prefersan emission tax over an output tax or a lump sum environmental tax. Thepublic utility regulator prefers the lump sum tax regime.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Baron, D. (1985), ‘Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality’, Rand Journal of Economics 16(4), 253–268.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Baron, D. (1985), ‘Regulation of Prices and Pollution Under Incomplete Information’, Journal of Public Economics 28, 211–231.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Besanko, D. and D. Sappington (1987), Designing Regulatory Policy with Limited Information. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), ‘Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making’, Journal of Political Economy 105(4), 752–769.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Hoel, M. (1998), ‘Emission Taxes versus Other Environmental Policies’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 100(1), 79–104.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Jebjerg, L. and H. Lando (1997), ‘Regulating a Polluting Firm under Asymmetric Information’, Environmental and Resource Economics 10(3), 267–284.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Lewis, T. (1996), ‘Protecting the Environment when Costs and Benefits are Privately Known’, Rand Journal of Economics 27(4), 819–847.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Schmutzler, A. and L. Goulder (1997), ‘The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32(1), 51–64.

    Google Scholar 

  9. van Egteren, H. (1996), ‘Regulating an Externality-Generating Public Utility: A Multidimensional Screening Approach’, European Economic Review 40, 1773–1797.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Alberta, 8-14 Tory Building, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T6G 2H4

    Henry van Egteren

Authors
  1. Henry van Egteren
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

van Egteren, H. Regulating an Externality-Generating Utility Environmental Taxes Under Limited Information . Environmental and Resource Economics 21, 107–133 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014521221896

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014521221896

Search

Navigation