Abstract
A growing concern in transition economies is the gap between the law on the books and the law in practice. The existence of such a gap has long been recognized even in countries with a long legal tradition and where, by and large, the formal law seems to be observed. In transition economies as well as in many emerging markets and developing countries, this gap appears to be especially pronounced. This paper argues that an explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the process of law development in these countries. They have extensively imported law from other countries in an attempt to stage a “catch-up” in legal development. This was facilitated by foreign legal advisors preaching the existence and transferability of best practice in other parts of the world. The missing link in this equation has been the demand for law. This paper seeks to explain the meaning of the demand for law in the context of evolving Russian constitutional law drawing extensively from research on legal transplants and the lack of demand for law in other areas of the law.
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Pistor, K. The Demand for Constitutional Law. Constitutional Political Economy 13, 73–87 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013639224631
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013639224631