Advertisement

Public Choice

, Volume 110, Issue 3–4, pp 225–243 | Cite as

Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

  • Lars-Erik Borge
  • Rune J. Sørensen
Article

Abstract

To understand the role of political parties in public budgetmaking, we need separate data about spending preferences andbudgetary outcomes. In this paper we employ such data todiscriminate between different models of how competing partypreferences are transformed into policy outcomes. In the firststep of the analysis data on politicians' spending preferencesare used to estimate the desired allocation of each party. Inthe second step the desired allocations are used as inputs ina separate analysis of the decision-making process inNorwegian local councils.

Keywords

Analysis Data Local Government Empirical Analysis Public Finance Separate Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 651–679.Google Scholar
  2. Bergstrom, T.C. and Goodman, R. (1973). Private demand for public goods. American Economic Review 63: 280–296.Google Scholar
  3. Berstrom, T.C., Rubinfeld, D.L. and Shapiro, P. (1982). Micro-based estimates of demand functions for local school expenditures. Econometrica 50: 1183–1205.Google Scholar
  4. Borcherding, T. and Deacon, R. (1972). The demand for services of non-federal governments. American Economic Review 62: 891–901.Google Scholar
  5. Borge, L.-E. and Rattsø, J. (1993). Dynamic responses to changing demand: A model of the reallocation process in small and large municipalities in Norway. Applied Economics 25: 589–598.Google Scholar
  6. Borge, L-E., Rattsø, J. and Sørensen, R.J. (1995). Local government service production: The politics of allocative sluggishness. Public Choice 82: 135–157.Google Scholar
  7. Boyne, G.A. (1985). Review article: Theory, methodology and results in political science: The case of output studies. British Journal of Political Science 15: 473–515.Google Scholar
  8. Fried, R.C. (1975). Comparative urban policy and performance. In N.W. Polsby and F.I. Greenstein (Eds.), Handbook of political science, Vol. 6, 305–379. Reading: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
  9. Inman, R.P. (1978). Testing political economy's “as if” proposition: Is the median voter really decisive. Public Choice 33: 45–65.Google Scholar
  10. Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1979). The elusive median voter. Journal of Public Economics 12: 143–170.Google Scholar
  11. Sørensen, R.J. (1995). The demand for local government goods: The impact of parties, committees and public sector politicians. European Journal of Political Research 27: 119–141.Google Scholar
  12. Sørensen, R.J. and Hagen, T.P. (1995). Do local politicians respond to citizens' demand?: A microanalysis of Norwegian local government. Scandinavian Political Studies 18: 53–71.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lars-Erik Borge
    • 1
  • Rune J. Sørensen
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsNorwegian University of Science and TechnologyTrondheimNorway
  2. 2.Norwegian School of Management (BI)SandvikaNorway

Personalised recommendations