Abstract
The paper discusses the implications of three models of elections (the median voter model, the proportional representation model, and the probabilistic voting model) on three functions of constitutional rules (constraining the majority of the people, monitoring political and bureaucratic agents, and keeping separate the levels of constitutional rules and of ordinary politics).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ackerman, B. (1991 - 1998) We the People: 1. Foundations (1991), 2. Transformations (1998). Cambridge (Mass.) and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Austen-Smith, D., and Banks, J. (1988) “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.” American Political Science Review 82: 405–22.
Brennan, G. (1997) “Rational Choice Political Theory.” In: Vincent, A. (ed.) Political Theory: Tradition and Diversity, pp. 89–111. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brennan, G., and Hamlin, A. (1998) “Constitutional Economics.” In: Newman, P. (ed.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 1, pp. 401–10. London: Macmillan.
Breton, A. (1996) Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brosio, G. (1988) “Patronage and Bureaucratic Efficiency.” European Journal of Political Economy 4, Extra Issue: 95–117.
Buchanan, J. M. (1975) “The Political Economy of Franchise in the Welfare State.” In: Selden, R. T. (ed.) Capitalism and Freedom: Problems and Prospects, pp. 52–77. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
Buchanan, J. M., and Congleton, R. D. (1998) Politics By Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J. M., and Musgrave, R. A. (1999) Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: The MIT Press.
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Coughlin, P. J. (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, G. W. (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dixit, A. K. (1996) The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: The MIT Press.
Hardin, R. (1989) “Why a Constitution?” In: Grofman, B., and Wittman, D. (eds.) The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, pp. 100–20. New York: Agathon Press.
Hillman, A. E. (1998) “Political Economy and Political Correctness.” Public Choice 96: 219–39.
Kirchgässner, G. (2000) “Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result.” Public Choice 103: 35–48.
Lafay, J.-D. (1993) “The Silent Revolution of Probabilistic Voting.” In: Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., and Wintrobe, R. (eds.) Preferences and Democracy: Villa Colombella Papers, pp. 159–91. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer.
Lucas, R. E. (1987) Models of Business Cycles. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Meltzer, A. H., Cukierman, A., and Richard, S. F. (1991) Political Economy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Meltzer, A. H., and Richard, S. F. (1981) “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” Journal of Political Economy 89: 914–27.
Merville, L. J., and Osborne, D. K. (1990) “Constitutional Democracy and the Theory of Agency.” Constitutional Political Economy 1(3): 21–47.
Miller, N. R. (1996) “Majority Rules and Minority Interests.” In: Shapiro, I., and Hardin, R. (eds.) Political Order (Nomos XXXVIII), pp. 207–250. New York and London: New York University Press.
Mueller, D. C. (1989) Public Choice II. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, D. C. (1996) Constitutional Democracy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Myerson, R. B. (1997) “Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction.” In: Kreps, D. M., and Wallis, K. F. (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, vol. 1, pp. 46–65. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Myerson, R. B. (1999) “Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems.” European Economic Review 43: 671–97.
North, D. C. (1993) “Institutions and Credible Commitments.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 11–23.
Ordeshook, P. C. (1993) “Some Rules of Constitutional Design.” In: Franken Paul, E., Miller, F. D., and Paul, J. (eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order, pp. 198–232. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. (1990) Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. Chur and London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. (1999) “Political Economics and Public Finance.” NBER Working Paper 7097. Forthcoming in: Auerbach, A., and Feldstein, M. (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, vol. III. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Popper, K. R. (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I: Plato, 5th ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. R. (1988) “On Democracy: The Open Society and Its Enemies Revisited.” The Economist, 23 April: 25–28.
Riker, W. (1982) Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco: Freeman.
Romer, T. (1975) “Individual Welfare, Majority Voting and the Properties of a Linear Income Tax.” Journal of Public Economics 7: 163–68.
Salmon, P. (1993) “Unpopular Policies and the Theory of Representative Democracy.” In: Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., and Wintrobe, R. (eds.) Preferences and Democracy: Villa Colombella Papers, pp. 13–39. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer.
Salmon, P. (1998) “Free Riding as Mechanism.” In: Backhouse, R., Hausman, D., Mäki, U., and Salanti, A. (eds.) Economics and Methodology: Crossing Boundaries, pp. 62–87. London: Macmillan.
Salmon, P. (2000) “Modèles et mécanismes en économie: essai de clarification de leurs relations.” Revue de Philosophie Economique 1(1): 104–26.
Salmon, P. (2001) “Ordinary Elections and Constitutional Arrangements.” In: Mudambi, R., Navarra, P., and Sobbrio, G. (eds.) Rules and Reason: Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy, pp. 165–80. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Salmon, P., and Wolfelsperger, A. (2001) “FrDe l'èquilibre au chaos et retour: bilan méthodologique des recherches sur la règle de majoritè.” Revue Française de Science Politique 51(3): 331–69.
Shepsle, K. A. (1979) “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 27–59.
Shepsle, K. A., and Weingast, B. R. (eds.) (1995) Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Tarr, G. A. (1996) (ed.) Constitutional Politics in the States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns. Westport and London: Greenwood Press.
Tullock, G. (1998) “Reply to Guttman.” European Journal of Political Economy 14: 215–18.
Voigt, S. (1999) Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach. Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton (Mass.): Edward Elgar.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Salmon, P. Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions. Constitutional Political Economy 12, 333–349 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012581007940
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012581007940