Abstract
In this paper, I analyze how the enlargement process is connected to the currently proposed institutional reforms in the European Union. Although the ‘official’ claim is that enlargement requires reform, the relationship between both processes needs clarification. The use of unanimity voting for policy issues leads to substantial deadlock in the current Union, a problem that could be solved by the introduction of (qualified) majority voting. Moreover, in view of its current ‘inflexibility’ enlargement would only marginally decrease the Union's capacity to make decisions. Under qualified majority rule, enlargement is likely to have little or no effect on ‘flexibility’ given the distribution of preferences of the member-states. Also, if qualified majority voting is used, enlargement would decrease the power of the current member-states in a future Union, especially the larger ones. This, and the possibility for current member-states to link enlargement with specific policy demands, could be the crucial factors in the timing and shaping of the enlargement process.
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Steunenberg, B. Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?. Constitutional Political Economy 12, 351–370 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012533124779
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012533124779