Abstract
This paper shows that non-productive activities aimed at influencing the distribution of income might increase when constitutional constraints against redistribution are imposed or strengthened. By facilitating redistribution, on the other hand, influence activities could be limited, and the economic performance improved. We argue that these effects could be important in countries with poorly developed democratic institutions, and that research in constitutional economics needs to be more aware of perverse effects of this kind.
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Bornefalk, A. Constitutional Constraints and Redistributive Activities. Constitutional Political Economy 12, 291–311 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012529207032
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012529207032