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Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling

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Abstract

Research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditures often result in patents, technologies and brand names which are difficult to accurately value. Under current generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) these intangible assets are generally not recognized in the financial statements, but instead are expensed in the period that they occur. Prior studies note that the market-to-book ratios of firms with significant levels of R&D and advertising expenditures suggest that investors, at least partially, value these assets. Researchers and practitioners argue that current GAAP, by not recognizing these intangible assets, reduces the usefulness and relevance of accounting reports.

We investigate whether companies with significant levels of intangible assets are more likely to emphasize dividend increases and stock repurchases (which are generally perceived as signaling favorable investment opportunities), instead of traditional accounting disclosures, as a means of overcoming adverse selection. Because these assets are difficult to measure, cash distributions may be viewed as a more credible means of signaling firm value to investors. Using analysts' ratings of firms' accounting disclosures, we find that companies with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures are less likely to provide extensive accounting disclosures and instead tend to employ dividend and stock repurchase signals. We obtain these results even after controlling for other firm attributes, such as size, stock returns performance, leverage, liquidity and investors' expectations of growth opportunities. We also find that the market reaction to dividend increase and stock repurchase announcements is greater for firms with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures, indicating that these announcements are more informative for such firms.

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Gelb, D.S., Siegel, P. Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 15, 307–323 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012046823636

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