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Ockham's Razor, Encounterability, and Ontological Naturalism

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  1. Department of History and Philosophy, Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, MI, 48197, U.S.A.

    J. M. Dieterle

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  1. J. M. Dieterle
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Dieterle, J.M. Ockham's Razor, Encounterability, and Ontological Naturalism. Erkenntnis 55, 51–72 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011954530445

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