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Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

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Abstract

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.

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Paton, D., Vaughan Williams, L. Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets. Review of Industrial Organization 19, 265–278 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011828216881

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