Abstract
This paper applies a refined market power test to examine market power in the U.S. aluminum industry. The study conducts a two-step analysis in which the inverse residual demand facing the industry is first estimated to generate the associate elasticity to infer market power, and then the inverse partial residual demand facing the industry is estimated to produce the elasticity to measure the potential effect of inter-industry coordination. The results suggest that only the primary industry attains market power, and the market power can exert even without collusion between the primary and secondary industries.
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Yang, SP. Measuring Market Power in the U.S. Aluminum Industry: A Residual Demand Approach. Review of Industrial Organization 19, 365–380 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011820525065
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011820525065