Abstract
This paper presents an interpretation of Plato's moral psychology in two books of the Republic that construes Plato as adopting a strong unity for the moral agent. Within this conception reason influences both emotion and action directly. This view is contrasted with the current prevailing interpretation according to which all three parts of the soul have their own reason, feeling, and desire. The latter construal is shown to be both philosophically weak, and less plausible as a historical reconstruction.
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Moravcsik, J. Inner Harmony and the Human Ideal in Republic IV and IX. The Journal of Ethics 5, 39–56 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011412807466
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011412807466