Iudex in Fabula: Some Reflections on Jackson's Paper

Abstract

The key issue of this paper is that Professor Jackson's attempt to shednew light on the notion of literal meaning is both stimulating andunconvincing. On the one hand he is perfectly right when he tries todraw attention to the shortcomings which affect most of the longstandingtheories about legal interpretation. In fact, his essay is based on thefooting that interpretation is under-determined by semantic rules andconventions. From such a point of view, as both rule-scepticism and thesemantic conception are old fashioned and unsound, we need acomprehensive theory of textual structures. On the other hand, however,Professor Jackson concedes too much to rule-scepticism with hisnarrative approach. Furthermore, his too sharp opposition between themodern Western model of law, mainly a written law where so-called``literal meaning'' is of the greatest importance (at least on anideological ground), and the model of early Biblical law, where themeaning stems from the social context, does not hold completely. It iseasy to find legal systems, for instance the later rabbinic law, whichneither of Jackson's two models can explain, since the reality of law isfar more complex than we believe.