Fundamental Rights

Abstract

This essay aims at laying the foundations for a general theory offundamental rights. It starts out from a formal and structuraldefinition of the concept of `fundamental right', which is definedas a non-disposable, universal right. The author believes thatthis definition can be used as a starting point for the constructionof a theory of constitutional democracy based on four main theses.1) As fundamental rights are non-disposable and universal, theyare structurally different from patrimonial rights, which aredisposable and individual; 2) fundamental rights constitute thecontent of substantial democracy, i.e. the positive and negativelimits set on the power exercisable by the majority that comprisesformal democracy; 3) citizenship, which is still the precondition forholding many fundamental rights, is a regressive category becauseit is a source of inequality; 4) a distinction must be drawn betweenfundamental rights and the guarantees (duties and sanctions) put in place to protect them. Should a legal order make provision forfundamental rights but fail to accompany them with the necessaryauarantees, the result is a gap that the legislator and the legalinterpreter have a duty to bridge. The theory of constitutionaldemocracy thus elaborated constitutes a profound change in classical(Kelsenian) legal positivism, which is no longer suitable forpresenting the law of contemporary states governed by the rule oflaw, and calls for a more active, critical attitude towards law both by the judge and by legal science.