Abstract
This paper analyses the economic efficiency ofmanagement regimes for the recreational use of anatural resource. Management must determine the useand development of the natural resource. Thefirst-best policy uses price to offset theexternalities of crowding and deterioration. This iscontrasted with two second-best polices which do notuse pricing: unrestricted access and quotas. Acondition under which a relaxation of quota levelincreases efficiency is derived. Under iso-elasticfunctional forms quotas are less efficient thanunrestricted access.
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Sibly, H. Pricing and Management of Recreational Activities Which Use Natural Resources. Environmental and Resource Economics 18, 339–354 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011165132180
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011165132180