Abstract
We develop a bioeconomic model of the northern Balticsalmon fishery that takes into account thesimultaneous harvest of wild and reared salmon. Weassess the optimal harvest allocation between thecommercial offshore, inshore, and estuary fisheries,and the recreational river fishery that sequentiallyharvest the salmon stock. We restrict the solution tospawning stocks sufficient to preserve the wildsalmon. Empirical results suggest closure of theoffshore and inshore fisheries. Optimal managementenhances the wild stock, and results in substantialeconomic gains to the fishery. Current fisheryregulation improves the performance of the fisheryover open access, but fails to utilize the fullproductive potential of the resource.
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Laukkanen, M. A Bioeconomic Analysis of the Northern Baltic Salmon Fishery: Coexistence versus Exclusion of Competing Sequential Fisheries. Environmental and Resource Economics 18, 293–315 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011164523802
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011164523802