Abstract
The ability of firms to operate in several markets at the same time is changing regulators' tasks. Regulatory bodies are now having to deal with multinational firms which spread their business activities all over the world. This paper analyzes the theory and practice of regulation in terms of the multinational dimensions of regulated firms. We show that the perceived theory of regulation is indeed affected, and that new issues arise both from a positive and normative point of view.
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Calzolari, G. The Theory and Practice of Regulation with Multinational Enterprises. Journal of Regulatory Economics 20, 191–211 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011107413701
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011107413701