Abstract
Most observers agree that institutions play significant roles both in causing and in confronting large scale environmental problems. But how can these arrangements, which are not actors in their own right, influence the interactive behavior of those whose actions give rise to these problems and, in the process, shape the character of collective outcomes? This essay compares and contrasts two families of models – collective-action models and social-practice models – that seek to expose the behavioral pathways through which institutions affect the course of human/environment interactions. After describing the assumptions embedded in the models, the paper examines the predictions that flow from them regarding: compliance, policy instruments, behavioral consistency, and durability. It then proposes a method for evaluating competing predictions by making use of critical tests of the sort familiar to natural scientists seeking to assess the merits of different models.
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Young, O.R. The Behavioral Effects of Environmental Regimes: Collective-Action vs. Social-Practice Models. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1, 9–29 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010181007938
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010181007938