Abstract
We use numerical methods to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) bid functions for four agents bidding in a first-price auction. Each bidder i is randomly assigned: ri ɛ [0, rmax], where 1 − ri is the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant relative risk aversion. Each ri is independently drawn from the cumulative distribution function Φ(ċ), a beta distribution on [0, rmax]. For various values of the maximum propensity to seek risk, rmax, the expected value of any bidder's risk characteristic, E(ri), and the probability that any bidder is risk seeking, P(ri > 1), we determine the nonlinear characteristics of the (NE) bid functions.
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Van Boening, M.V., Rassenti, S.J. & Smith, V.L. Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes. Experimental Economics 1, 147–159 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009992209358
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009992209358