Abstract
In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Boles, T. and Messick, D. (1990). “Accepting Unfairness: Temporal Influence on Choice.” In K. Borcherding, O. Larichev, and D. Messick (eds.), Comtemporary Issues in Decision Making. Elsevier, North-Holland.
Bolton, G. and Ockenfels, A. (1997). “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.” Mimeo.
Brandts, J. and Solà, C. (1998). “Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games.” Mimeo.
Camerer, C., Knez, M., and Weber, R. (1996). “Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and 'Weak Link' Coordination Games.” Mimeo.
Cason, T. and Mui, V.-L. (forthcoming). “Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (1999). “Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model.” Mimeo.
Croson, R. (1997). “The Disjunction Effect and Nonconsequential Reasoning in Dominant Strategy Games: Extensions and Limitations.” Mimeo.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. (1997). “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Mimeo.
Glasnapp, D. and Poggio, J. (1985). Essentials of Statistical Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Merrill, Columbus.
Güth, W., Huck, S., and Müller, W. (1999). “The Relevance of Equal Splits: On a Behavioral Discontinuity in Ultimatum Games.” Mimeo.
Loewenstein, G. (1996). “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 65, 272–292.
Nozick, R. (1969). “Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice.” In N. Rescher, (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl. G. Hempel. pp. 115–146.
Rabin, M. (1993). “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American Economic Review. 83, 1281–1302.
Rapoport, A. (1997). “Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form.” International Journal of Game Theory. 26, 113–136.
Roth, A. (1995). “Bargaining Experiments.” In J. Kagel and A. Roth, (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. pp. 253–348.
Savage, L. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York.
Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., and Wilson, C. (1994). “A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects.” Games and Economic Behavior. 6, 445–468.
Selten, R. (1967). “Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des Eingeschr¨ankt Rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments.” In H. Sauermann, (ed.), Beiträge zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. pp. 136–168.
Shafir, E. and Tversky, A. (1992), “Thinking through Uncertainty: Nonconsequentalist Reasoning and Choice.” Cognitive Psychology. 24, 449–474.
Tversky, A. and Shafir, E. (1992). “The Disjunction Effect in Choice under Uncertainty.” Psychological Science. 3, 305–309.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brandts, J., Charness, G. Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games. Experimental Economics 2, 227–238 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009962612354
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009962612354