Abstract
I present two different “models” of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities.
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Fischer, J.M. Responsibility and Self-Expression. The Journal of Ethics 3, 277–297 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009881327796
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009881327796