We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called “contract-intensive money” or CIM, is based on citizens’ decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.
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Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S. et al. Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance. Journal of Economic Growth 4, 185–211 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009854405184
- contract enforcement
- property rights
- economic growth