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Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

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Abstract

This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.

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  1. The University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 6AA, UK

    H. Lillehammer

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  1. H. Lillehammer
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Lillehammer, H. Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. The Journal of Ethics 4, 173–190 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009822006329

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009822006329

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