Skip to main content
Log in

Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations

  • Published:
Constitutional Political Economy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The word “coordination” has two meanings, and thesemeanings are often conflated. One meaning, associated with ThomasSchelling, is seen in situations like choosing whether to driveon the left or the right; the drivers must coordinate to eachother's behavior. The other meaning, associated with FriedrichHayek, means that a concatenation of activities is arranged soas to produce good results. Along with the Schelling sense ofcoordination comes the notion of convention, such as drivingon the right. Some conventions are consciously designed; othersemerge without design (or are “emergent”). Along with the Hayeksense of coordination comes the notion of social order. Somesocial orders, such as the skeleton of activities within thefirm or within the hypothetical socialist economy, are consciouslyplanned. Other social orders, such as the catallaxy of the freesociety, function without central planning (or are “spontaneous”).Distinguishing between the two coordinations (and, in parallelfashion, between convention and social order) clarifies thinkingand resolves some confusions that have arisen in discussionsof “coordination” and “spontaneous order.” The key distinctionsare discussed in the context of the thought of, on the one hand,Menger, Schelling, David Lewis, and the recent path-dependencetheorists, and, on the other hand, Smith, Hayek, Polanyi, Coase,and the modern Austrian economists. The paper concludes witha typology that encompasses the several distinctions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Arthur, W. B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barry, N. (1982) "The Tradition of Spontaneous Order." Literature of Liberty5: 7–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. H. (1988 [1937]) "The Nature of the Firm." Economica, n.s. 4: 386–405. Reprinted in The Firm, the Market, and the Law, 33-55. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald H. (1992) "The Insitituional Structure of Production." The 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Science. American Economic Review 82: 713–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Comte, A. (1896) The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. 3 vols. Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Marineau. London: George Bell & Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • David, P. A. (1985) "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." American Economic Review 75: 332–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeVany, A. (1996) "Information, Chance, and Evolution: Alchian and the Economics of Self-Organization." Economic Inquiry 34 (July): 427–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Durkheim, E. (1964) The Division of Labor in Society. Trans. by George Simpson. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, D. (1996) Hidden Order: The Economics of Everyday Life. New York: Harper Business.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, Friedrich A. (1948 [1945]) "The Use of Knowledge in Society." In: Hayek, F. A. (ed.) Individualism and Economic Order, 77–91. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. (1964) "Kinds of Order in Society." New Individualist Review 3: 3–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. (1973) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 1, Rules and Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. (1994) Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue, Kresge, S. and Wenar, L. (eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • High, J. (1986) "Equilibration and Disequilibration in the Market Process." In: Kirzner, I. M. (ed.) Subjectivism, Intellgibility and Economic Understanding: Essays in Honor of Ludwig M. Lachmann, 111–21. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, I. M. (1973) Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, I.M. (1992) The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lachmann, L. M. (1971) The Legacy of Max Weber. Berkeley: Glendessary Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lachmann, L. M. (1986) The Market as an Economic Process. New York: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. K. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Liebowitz, S. J. and Margolis, S. E. (1990) "The Fable of the Keys." Journal of Law and Economics 33: 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Liebowitz, S. J. and Margolis, S. E. (1995) "Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11: 205–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menger, C. (1985 [1883]) Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics. Edited by L. Schneider, with a new introduction by Lawrence H. White. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, M. (1951) The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. C. (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, Thomas C. (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, L. (1985 [1963]) "Introduction." In: Menger, C. (ed.) Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences, 1–21. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Adam. (1937 [1776]) The Wealth of Nations. Edited by E. Cannan. New York: Modern Library.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, A. (1978) Lectures on Jurisprudence. Edited by R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spencer, Herbert. (1969 [1884/1892]) The Man Versus the State. Edited by D. McRae. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden, R. (1989) "Spontaneous Order." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3: 85–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tucker, W. (1996) "Complex Questions: The New Science of Spontaneous Order." Reason (January) 34–38.

  • White, L. H. (1985) "Introduction to the New York University Press Edition." In: Menger, C. (ed.) Investigations Into the Method of the Social Sciences, vii-xviii. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, P. H. (1996) "The Economics of Convention." Journal of Economic Perspectives 10: 105–22.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Klein, D.B. Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations. Constitutional Political Economy 8, 319–335 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009077330132

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009077330132

Keywords

Navigation