Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 195–213

Consent for Change: Article V and The Constitutional Amendment Process

  • Thomas F. Schaller

DOI: 10.1023/A:1009075829915

Cite this article as:
Schaller, T.F. Constitutional Political Economy (1997) 8: 195. doi:10.1023/A:1009075829915


The political economy of U.S. constitutional amendmentswithin the guidelines of Article V is shown to tend toward minoritarianism.Specifically, two shifts reduce the consent necessary to passamendments, each potentially raising the social costs of changingthe Constitution by amendment. A typology of amending “climates”is offered, followed by a discussion of the normative implicationsfor constitutional stability of minoritarian rule in amendmentpolitics.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas F. Schaller
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceBinghamton UniversityBinghamton

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