Abstract
This paper provides a model of democratic government as a compound of independent elective and non elective “centers of power” that compete in fostering the demands of voters and of interest groups. The analysis describes how interests of voters and of pressure groups are represented and under what conditions the compound democracy is more responsive to voters' or to interest groups' demands. These conditions are shown to depend on the center of power's relative opportunity costs at serving a plurality of interests and on the severeness of informational asymmetries between voters and interest groups.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Austen-Smith, D. (1996) “Interest Groups: Money, Information and Influence.” In: Mueller, D. C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook, pp. 296-321. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J. M. (1980) The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Breton, A. (1996) Competitive Governments. An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Denzau, A. T., and Munger, M. C. (1986) “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” American Political Science Review 80: 89-106.
Inman, R. P., and Rubinfeld, D. L. (1996) “The Political Economy of Federalism.” In: Mueller, D. C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook, pp. 73-105. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frey, B. S. (1996) “The Public Choice of International Organizations.” In: Mueller, D. C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook, pp. 106-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laffont, J. J., and Martimort D. (1998) “Transaction Costs, Institutional Design and the Separation of Powers.” European Economic Review 42: 673-684.
Landes, W. M., and Posner, R. A. (1975) “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective.” Journal of Law and Economics 18: 875-901.
McCormick, R. E., and Tollison, R. D. (1981) Politicians, Legislation and the Economy. An Inquiry into the Interest Group Theory of Government. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
Moe, T. M. (1996) “The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy.” In: Mueller, D. C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook, pp. 445-80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, D. C. (1989) Public Choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, D. C. (ed.) (1996) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. New York: Aldine Atherton.
Olson, M. Jr. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., and Walker J. (1996) “Neither Markets Nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collecting Action Arenas.” In: Mueller, D. C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook, pp. 35-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, V. (1987) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Designing the American Experiment. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Persson T., Roland G., and Tabellini G. (1997a) “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1163-1202.
Persson T., Roland G., and Tabellini G. (1997b) “Comparative Politics and Public Finance.” IGIER Working Paper n. 114.
Rowley, C. K. (1994) “Introduction.” In: Rowley, C. K. (ed.) Public Choice Theory, Vol. I. Aldershot: Edward Elgar: IX-XXIX.
Tollison, R. D. (1996) “Rent Seeking.” In: Mueller, D. C. (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook, pp. 506-25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weingast, B. R, and Marshall, W. (1988) “The Industrial Organization of Congress: Or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 89: 642-664.
Wittman, D. (1989) “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results.” Journal of Political Economy 97: 1395-1424.
Wittman, D. (1996) The Myth of Democratic Failure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bavetta, S., Padovano, F. A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy. Constitutional Political Economy 11, 5–25 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009010715599
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009010715599