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Evolutionary Stability in the Ultimatum Game

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Abstract

Biologically motivated concepts of evolutionary stability, like the ESS, consider robustness against tiny invasions of mutants. This paper considers larger invasions and proposes an extended stability calculus. The new concept is applied to the ultimatum game and gives an evolutionary explanation for the emergence of egalitarian, "fair" behaviour.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, D-20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Ralf Peters

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  1. Ralf Peters
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Peters, R. Evolutionary Stability in the Ultimatum Game. Group Decision and Negotiation 9, 315–324 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008728906472

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008728906472

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