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The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?

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Abstract

Using a constitutional political economy perspective, we study the paradox of government (how a limited government can stay limited) and the different ways in which systems of law try to solve it. We then provide a tentative application to a possible European state and assess the relevance of some member countries' constitutional and administrative law, if they were both to develop and to contain this European state.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Crefaur, University de Rennes I, France

    JEAN-MICHEL Josselin

  2. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Greqam, University de Corse-Pascal Paoli, France

    ALAIN Marciano

Authors
  1. JEAN-MICHEL Josselin
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  2. ALAIN Marciano
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Josselin, JM., Marciano, A. The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?. European Journal of Law and Economics 4, 5–22 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008640527408

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