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Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the UK government's proposals for the reform of legal aid, which are based on block franchising. We identify several potential incentive-compatibility problems mainly concerned with the possibility of chiseling on quality after contracts are awarded or with supplier control of access to legal aid. Our suggestions for improving the scheme are based around awarding vouchers for legal aid.

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Dnes, A., Rickman, N. Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals. European Journal of Law and Economics 5, 247–265 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008633700234

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