Abstract
Foreign acquisitions have been growingdramatically since the 1980s despite academic studiesshowing that shareholders of acquirers generally donot realize any significant gain. In this paper, weinvestigate whether foreign acquisitions aremotivated by managerial self-interest. Logisticregressions are performed to establish a link betweenforeign acquisitions and the acquirer's free cashflow. The results show that foreign acquisitions oflow-Q firms are strongly influenced by managerialdiscretion. In addition, acquisitions of low-Q firmsare conducted without consideration of theperformance of the acquirers. Foreign acquisitions ofhigh-Q firms, however, do not representoverinvestments.
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Yung, K.K. Foreign Acquisitions and Managerial Discretion. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 16, 53–63 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008388307352
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008388307352