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Predicting Subsequent Management Forecasting Behavior at the Date of an Initial Public Offering

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Abstract

In this study, we examine the conditions and choices of firms at dates of initial public offerings (IPOs) as a basis for predicting their likelihood of management earnings forecast disclosure in post-IPO periods. Using a sample of 944 IPOs, we demonstrate that firms choosing to reduce IPO information asymmetries or signal issue quality by choosing prestigious underwriters, high quality auditors, and higher percentages of retained ownership tend to issue management forecasts in the post-IPO period. These relationships exist after controlling for IPO date measures of risk/stability, a construct that prior management forecast research has found to be a key determinant of the forecasting act.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, USA

    Stephen P. Baginski (Professor of Accounting) & John M. Hassell

  2. Chapman University, USA

    John D. Neill (Associate Professor of Accounting)

Authors
  1. Stephen P. Baginski
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  2. John M. Hassell
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  3. John D. Neill
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Baginski, S.P., Hassell, J.M. & Neill, J.D. Predicting Subsequent Management Forecasting Behavior at the Date of an Initial Public Offering. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 12, 5–21 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008304206249

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