Abstract
A lively debate has developed concerning the incentive for a price-regulated input monopolist to engage in non-price discrimination if it vertically integrates into downstream markets. This paper identifies the key industry characteristics that determine whether such discrimination is likely, and studies both theoretically and numerically the tradeoffs among three important characteristics in the simplest extant model. The incentive to discriminate is theoretically ambiguous, but data for the US telecommunications industry indicate that discrimination is likely in the absence of policy-induced countervailing incentives. Countervailing policies include direct penalties for discriminatory behavior, forcing vertical autonomy, and fostering upstream competition.
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Mandy, D.M. Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays. Journal of Regulatory Economics 17, 157–172 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008191911289
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008191911289