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The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically-Integrated Regulated Firm: A Reply

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Abstract

In Weisman (1995), I construct a model to investigate the incentives of a vertically-integrated regulated firm to discriminate against downstream rivals. This model suggests that the RBOCs do not have the same incentives to discriminate as AT&T prior to divestiture. Reiffen (1998) questions this and other conclusions. This reply addresses his claims.

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References

  • Beard, T. Randolph, David L. Kaserman, and John W. Mayo. 1996. “Regulation, Vertical Integration, and Sabotage.” Mimeo (November).

  • Economides, Nicholas. 1997. “The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist.” Stanford University Working Paper.

  • Reiffen, David. 1998. “A Regulated Firm's Incentive To Discriminate: A Reevaluation and Extension of Weisman's Result.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 14:1 (this volume).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of, Kansas State University, Economics, Waters Hall, Manhattan, KS, 66506-4001

    Dennis L. Weisman

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  1. Dennis L. Weisman
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Weisman, D.L. The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically-Integrated Regulated Firm: A Reply. Journal of Regulatory Economics 14, 87–91 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008031906785

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008031906785

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