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Exercising Property Rights to Pollute: Do Cancer Risks and Politics Affect Plant Emission Reductions?

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Abstract

This paper examines whether firms' decisions about reductions in toxic emissions depend on the magnitude of dangers arising from their pollution and on who bears pollutant risks. Controlling for the quantity of air toxics released in 1988, this article finds that plants whose emissions generated higher numbers of expected cancer cases did reduce their emissions more between 1988 and 1991. The nature of the community bearing the pollution risk also affected firm decisions. The higher the voter turnout in the area, a proxy for residents' likelihood of collective action, the greater the reductions in a plant's release of air carcinogens.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC, 27708

    James T. Hamilton

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  1. James T. Hamilton
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Hamilton, J.T. Exercising Property Rights to Pollute: Do Cancer Risks and Politics Affect Plant Emission Reductions?. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 18, 105–124 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007877728961

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