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Merger Policy in the United States: A Reconsideration

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Bwz-Brünner Strasse 72, a-1210, Vienna, Austria

    Dennis C. Mueller

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Mueller, D.C. Merger Policy in the United States: A Reconsideration. Review of Industrial Organization 12, 655–685 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007797626160

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